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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the performance of private equity partnerships using a data set of individual
fund returns collected by Venture Economics. Over the sample period, average fund returns net of
fees approximately equal the S\&P 500 although there is a large degree of heterogeneity. Returns
persist strongly across funds raised by individual private equity partnerships. Better performing
funds are more likely to raise follow-on funds and raise larger funds than funds that perform poorly.
This relationship is concave so that top performing funds do not grow proportionally as much as the
average fund. Finally, market entry in private equity is cyclical. Funds (and partnerships) started in
boom times are less likely to raise follow-on funds, suggesting that these funds subsequently
perform worse. Several of these results differ markedly from those for mutual funds.
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The private equity industry, primarily venture capital (VC) and buyout (LBO) investments, has
grown tremendously over the last decade. While less than $10 billion was committed to private
equity partnerships in 1991, more than $180 billion was committed at the peak in 2000. (See
for example Jesse Reyes, Private Equity Overview and Update 2002). The increased investment
coincided with well-publicized returns to some private equity funds, especially at the end of the
1990s. Moreover, venture capital has received a great deal of attention for its role in the surge of
entrepreneurship in the 1990s in the US.
Despite the heightened interest in the private equity asset class and the potential importance
of private equity investments for the economy as a whole, we have only a limited understanding of
the dynamics of fund returns and the ow of capital into the industry overall and into individual
funds. One of the main obstacles has been the lack of available data. As the name private equity
suggests, private equity rms are largely exempt from the disclosure requirements that public rms
are subject to.
In this paper, we make use of a data set of individual fund performance collected by Venture
Economics.1 The Venture Economics data set is based on voluntary reporting of fund returns by
the private equity rms (or general partners) as well as their limited partners. This data set allows
us to study three issues that have not been closely examined previously. First, we investigate the
characteristics of fund performance in the private equity industry. Most strikingly, we nd large
heterogeneity in returns across funds and time periods. On average, LBO fund returns net of fees
are lower than those of the S&P 500, while VC fund returns are lower than the S&P 500 on an
equal-weighted basis, but higher than the S&P 500 on a capital weighted basis.2 These results
combined with previous evidence on private equity fees, however, suggest that on average both
types of private equity returns exceed those of the S&P 500 gross of fees.3
Second, we document substantial persistence in fund performance in the private equity industry,
both for LBO and VC funds. We nd strong persistence not only between two consecutive funds,
1We thank Jesse Reyes from Venture Economics for making the data available.
2These results compare returns to the S&P 500 and, therefore, do not adjust for systematic risk. We discuss this
in some detail in the text.
3Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003), Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003), and Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
study related questions.
2but also between the current fund and the second previous fund. General partners (GPs) whose
funds outperform the industry in one fund are likely to outperform the industry in the next; GPs
who underperform are likely to repeat this performance as well. The persistence does not appear
to be caused by risk dierences. These ndings are markedly dierent from the results for mutual
funds, where persistence has been dicult to detect and, when detected, tends to be driven by
persistent underperformance rather than over-performance.4 We explore potential explanations for
the dierence from other asset classes in our discussion.
Third, we study the relation of fund performance to capital ows, fund size and overall fund
survival. We analyze how a funds track record aects capital ows into individual partnerships
and the industry overall. We document that fund ows are positively related to past performance.
In contrast to the convex relationship in the mutual fund industry, however, this relationship is
concave in private equity (see Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Chen et
al. (2003)). Similarly, we nd that partnerships are more likely to be started in periods after the
industry has performed especially well. But funds that are raised in boom times (and partnerships
which are started during booms) are less likely to raise follow-on funds, indicating that these funds
probably perform poorly. The marginal dollar that ows into the industry in these times, therefore,
does not appear to go to the top funds, but to funds that have a lower probability of being able
to raise a next fund. Finally, we also show that the dilution of overall industry performance in
periods when many new funds enter is mainly driven by the poor performance of new entrants.
The performance of established funds is less aected.
In the last section of the paper, we discuss possible explanations for our ndings in the private
equity industry. Underlying heterogeneity in the skills and quality of general partners can lead
to heterogeneity in performance and result in more persistence if new entrants have diculties
competing eectively with existing funds. There are a number of forces that might make it dicult
to drive down the margins of established funds. First, many practitioners assert that unlike the
case for mutual fund and hedge fund investors, private equity investors can have proprietary access
4In fact, many recent papers in this literature question whether there is any evidence of actual persistence given
the selection issues that many mutual fund data sets face. See Carhart et al. (2002) for a comprehensive review
of this topic and Berk and Green (2003) for a model of mutual funds returns and capital ows. Our ndings on
persistence also dier from those for hedge funds, which provide little or modest evidence of persistence. See Bares,
Gibson, and Gyger (2002), Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999), Edwards and Cagalyan (2001), and Kat and
Menexe (2002).
3to particular transactions, i.e., proprietary deal ow. In other words, better funds may see better
investments. Second, private equity investors typically provide management or advisory inputs
along with capital. If high-quality general partners are a scarce commodity, dierences in returns
between funds can persist. (See Hellman and Puri (2002).) Third, there is some evidence that
better venture capital funds get better deal terms (i.e. lower valuations) when negotiating with
start-ups. (See the paper by Hsu (2002).) A start-up would be willing to do this if the investor
provided superior management, advisory, or reputational inputs.
At the same time, if the persistence results are driven by heterogeneity in GP skills, it is
puzzling that these returns to superior skill are not appropriated by the scarce input factor in the
form of higher fees and larger funds as has been suggested for mutual funds. (See Berk and Green
(2003).) From Gompers and Lerner (1999), we know that compensation was very homogeneous
across private equity partnerships over our sample period. Most funds used a compensation scheme
of annual management fees of 1.5% to 2.5% of committed capital and a 20% carried interest or
share of the prots. Moreover, growing the size of the fund potentially leads to lower marginal
and average productivity if funds operate with a concave production function. We nd evidence
that fund returns decline when partnerships grow their next fund abnormally fast. 5 But again, it
appears that in our sample period, the top performing funds on average grew proportionally slower
than the median and lower performing funds.
Our results suggest that the forces operating in the private equity industry have not been strong
enough to drive away persistence. These eects might have changed in the late 1990s as this was
a period of substantial growth in fund size (especially for top performing funds). Moreover, the
top performing venture capital funds moved towards a carried interest of 30% during that period.
Unfortunately, we will not be able to say anything denite about these eects for a number of years
until the returns of those funds have been realized.6
5For related evidence for mutual funds, see Chen et al. (2003).
6It is also interesting that recently many of the top funds in the industry have voluntarily returned large fractions
of the committed capital to their limited partners; most likely because they are concerned about the eect of poor
performance on their reputation.
41.1 Related Literature on Private Equity
Private equity investing is typically carried out through a limited partnership structure in which
the private equity rm or partnership serves as the general partner (GP). The limited partners
(LPs) consist largely of institutional investors and wealthy individuals who provide the bulk of the
capital. We refer to each individual limited partnership as a fund. The LPs commit to provide a
certain amount of capital to the fund. The GP then has an agreed time period in which to invest
the committed capital - usually on the order of ve years. The GP also has an agreed time period in
which to return capital to the LPs - usually on the order of ten to twelve years in total. Each fund
or limited partnership, therefore, is essentially a closed end fund with a nite life. When the GP
exhausts a substantial portion of a funds committed capital, the GP typically attempts to obtain
commitments for a subsequent (and separate) fund.
There is a growing literature studying the economics of the private equity industry. Most of the
existing studies either have focused on aggregate trends in private equity or have been interested
in the relation between general partners and entrepreneurs. This restriction is mainly due to the
diculty of obtaining information on individual fund performance. Two recent exceptions are Jones
and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) and Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) who study private equity returns
at the partnership level. We discuss their results and the comparison to the current study in some
detail in our section describing average returns.
Gompers and Lerner (1998) look at aggregate performance and capital ows. The authors nd
that macroeconomic factors like past industry performance and overall economic performance as
well as changes in the capital gains tax or ERISA provisions are related to increased capital ows
into private equity. A paper that characterizes venture capital returns based on the economics of
individual deals is Cochrane (2001). The author nds that venture returns are very volatile, but
later stage deals are less risky than early stage deals.
Papers that focus on the relation between general partners and entrepreneurs include Kaplan
and Stromberg (2003) who document the structure of incentive contracts between venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs. Gompers and Lerner (2000) suggest that the valuation of individual deals is
aected by overall macroeconomic conditions and the degree of competition in the venture capital
industry.
52 Data
The data for this study have been obtained from Venture Economics. Venture Economics collects
quarterly information on individual funds in the private equity industry. The Venture Economics
data set is based on voluntary reporting of fund information by the private equity rms as well as
by their limited partners. Venture Economics claims that because they receive information from
both the GPs and LPs, there is \little opportunity for inconsistent reporting." Given the private
nature of the data, we cannot validate this statement. It seems likely, however, that any bias would
be one toward over-reporting by better-performing funds. If present, this would create an upward
bias on our results on average returns. At the same time this would make it more dicult to nd
persistence.
The sample covers the years 1980 to 2001. Because of the rapid growth of the industry in
the 1990s, the earlier years contain fewer observations of funds than the later years. The Venture
Economics data for each fund include the quarterly performance measures that were collected from
GPs and LPs. These measures are the internal rate of return (IRR), the cumulative total value to
paid-in capital (TVPI), and the distributed total value to paid-in capital (DPI). Venture Economics
also collects the quarterly cash ows in and out of each fund for the life of the fund or through
the end of 2001. All these performance measures as well as the cash ows are reported net of
management fee and carried interest. We do not know the identities of the particular GPs, but we
do know the sequence number of each fund, i.e., if the fund is the rst, second, etc. raised by the
particular GP.
Throughout the paper, we use two samples of the data. In the main part of the analysis, we
include funds: (1) that have been ocially liquidated; or (2) whose returns are unchanged for at
least the nal six quarters we observe; and (3) whose reported unrealized value is less than 10%
of committed capital. These criteria make it highly likely that the funds we include are largely
liquidated and that the performance measures we calculate are based almost entirely on cash ows
to LPs rather than subjective estimates of value by the GPs. We also exclude funds with less than
$5 million of committed capital in 1990 dollars to focus on economically meaningful funds. We
obtain 746 funds that satisfy these criteria, consisting largely of funds started before 1995.
We also use a larger sample of funds that have either been ocially liquidated or were started
before 1997. This means that the fund has either been liquidated or has had at least ve years to
6realize returns on its investments. We also exclude funds with less than $5 million of committed
capital in 1990 dollars. Using these sample selection criteria, we obtain a sample of 1090 funds.
Because these funds are not all fully realized and we cannot reliably calculate performance for all
the funds, we use the Venture Economics reported IRRs. This sample is less likely to be subject
to the look ahead bias described in Carhart et al. (2002).
We report most of our results using the smaller sample. Unless otherwise noted, however, the
ndings reported in the paper are qualitatively unchanged when we use the second, larger sample.
3 Descriptive Statistics
Columns (1) to (3) of table 1 report the descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of 746 funds that
are largely liquidated and for which we have calculated performance measures. Roughly 78% of the
funds in our sample are venture capital funds while 22% are buyout funds. To get a sense of any
potential selection bias in our sample of fund returns, columns (4) to (6) of table 1 report the same
statistics for all 1814 funds that are described in Venture Economics and were raised before 1995.
We exclude funds that have a vintage year of 1995 or later to match the sample period of the funds
we use in our analyses. Our sub-sample covers about 40% of the funds in Venture Economics over
the same time period. Roughly 50% of the funds raised do not provide performance data. The
remaining 10% of the funds are not fully liquidated. The funds for which we have performance
measures are larger on average than the funds in the full sample. The average size of the funds in our
sample is $172 million (all gures in 1990 dollars), with venture funds being substantially smaller
than buyout funds, $103 million versus $416 million. These compare to average fund size in the
full sample of $116 million for all funds, $53 million for venture funds, and $262 million for buyout
funds. These averages imply that our performance sample includes 88% of capital committed to
venture funds and 49% of capital committed to buyout funds. 7
Table 1 also documents the fraction of rst time funds, second time and third time funds in the
two samples. In the sample with returns, 41% of the funds are rst time funds, 23% are second time
funds and 14% are third time funds. The remaining 22% are funds with higher sequence numbers.
7As mentioned previously, we obtain similar results with the larger sample of 1090 funds. That larger sample
includes 92% of capital committed to VC funds and 54% of capital committed to buyout funds for the relevant time
period.
7The corresponding percentages for the full sample are very similar: 40% are rst time funds, 21%
are second time funds, 13% are third time funds, and 25% are funds with higher sequence numbers.
The potential selection bias in our returns sample, therefore, is toward larger funds. As we
show later, larger funds tend to perform better than smaller ones, potentially inducing an upward
bias on the performance of funds with returns. We also over-sample rst time funds for buyouts.
As we show later, rst-time funds do not perform as well as higher sequence number funds. Our
results for average returns, therefore, should be interpreted with these potential biases in mind.
We are less concerned about any potential biases in our sample regarding the persistence and
fundraising results. The mutual fund literature has shown that one important source of bias is that
poorly performing funds stop reporting but resume reporting once their returns are better again.
According to Venture Economics, this does not occur. We also observe in the data that once a
fund is included in the data, it does not stop reporting performance before the fund is liquidated.
A second type of bias would be that partnerships do not report returns for a fund all together, if
they expect this fund to perform poorly. In this case, we should be less likely to nd persistence
at the lower end. We will show however that this is not the case in our data.
3.1 Private Equity Performance
In this section, we describe private equity performance and compare that performance to the
performance of the S&P 500. We report performance in three ways. First, we report the internal
rate of return of the fund calculated by Venture Economics. Second, we report the internal rate of
return of the fund that we calculate using the fund cash ows. Third, we calculate what is referred
to in the private equity industry as the public market equivalent, or PME. The PME measures
the discounted value of the cash outows of the fund relative to the discounted value of the cash
inows (all net of fees), where discounting is undertaken using the total return to the S&P 500.
This calculation has the eect of comparing investing in the fund to investing in the S&P 500. A
fund with a PME greater than one outperformed the S&P 500 (net of all fees). We (not Venture
Economics) perform the PME calculations using fund cash ows.
Before proceeding, we want to point out three issues regarding PME and performance measures
in private equity more generally. If private equity returns have a beta greater than one, PME will
overstate the true risk-adjusted returns to private equity. In this study, we do not attempt to make
8more complicated risk adjustments than benchmarking cash ows with the S&P 500 because of
the lack of a true market value in the early years of a funds life. Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003)
attempt such calculations using net asset values reported quarterly by Venture Economics. They
nd that VC funds have a market beta of 1.11 while LBO funds have a beta of 0.81. Ljungqvist
and Richardson (2003) use a dierent methodology and nd that both VC funds and LBO funds
have a market beta of roughly 1.10 with relatively little variation across funds.
We believe it is possible that the results in these two papers understate the market risk of private
equity funds because most venture capital funds invest in young companies in high technology
industries with equity betas that exceed 1.00. Similarly, we believe that it is possible that the
market risk for buyout funds exceeds one because these funds invest in highly leveraged companies.
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) nd portfolio betas of roughly 1.10 for buyout funds under the
assumption that the typical buyout fund portfolio company has the same equity beta as the typical
public company in the same industry. However, because of the high leverage used in the typical
buyout deal, buyout rms' equity betas are likely to be greater than those for public companies in
the same industry.
Table 2 reports the three dierent performance measures for all private equity funds, VC funds
only, and Buyout funds only for the 746 funds with largely complete cash ow data. The rst
number in each cell is the median return, the next is the average return followed by the standard
deviation. The last row in each cell contains the returns at the 25th and 75th percentile.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the performance measures on an equal-weighted basis while panel
B reports them on a commitment value- or fund size-weighted basis. Panel A indicates that the
equal-weighted median and average IRRs reported by Venture Economics over the sample period
are 12% and 17%, respectively. Returns to buyout funds are slightly higher than the returns to
venture funds. The IRRs that we calculate from the cash ows are virtually identical. Panel A also
indicates that the median and average funds have PMEs of 0.74 and 0.96, respectively, indicating
that private equity has returned slightly less then an investment in the S&P 500 over the sample
period. The average PMEs to VC and buyout funds are roughly the same at 0.96 and 0.97.
Finally, the table is suggestive of one additional quality of private equity returns. There appear
to be large dierences in the returns of individual funds. The funds at the 25th percentile show a
cash ow IRR of 3% while the funds at the 75th percentile exhibit a cash ow IRR of 22% per year.
9The amount of variation seems qualitatively similar for all performance measures, and is greater
for VC funds alone.
The value-weighted performance in Panel B of Table 2 is better than the equal-weighted per-
formance. The Venture Economics IRRs are a median 14% and average 18% while the cash ow
IRRs are a median of 12% and an average of 18%. The PMEs increase to a median of 0.82 and an
average of 1.05, indicating that an investment in private equity slightly outperforms the S&P on
average. There is a substantial dierence between the average PMEs for VC and buyout funds. VC
funds have average PMEs of 1.21 while buyout funds have average PMEs of 0.93. This dierence
is driven by the fact that the larger VC funds of the 1990s outperformed the smaller VC funds of
the 1980s while the opposite was true for buyout funds.
It is worth pointing out that the average returns net of fees of 0.96 (equal-weighted) and 1.05
(value-weighted) suggest that the average returns to private equity gross of fees in both cases exceed
the S&P 500. Unfortunately, we do not have information on GP compensation in individual funds.
However, we know from Gompers and Lerner (1999) that GP compensation is fairly uniform for VC
funds. They nd that the carried interest or prot share for VC funds is almost always 20%. Our
discussions with industry participants indicate that the same is true for buyout funds. Gompers
and Lerner (1999) also nd that the discounted value of management fees for VC funds (discounted
at 10%) equals 16% to 19% of committed capital. Conservatively, the management fees would
reduce the denominator of PME by 8% { half of the Gompers and Lerner estimate while adding
back the private equity prot share of 0increase the numerator by at least 5PMEs well above one,
both on an equal- and value-weighted basis for both VC and buyout funds.
Table 3 presents performance results for the 1090 funds in the larger sample. To put all the
funds on an equal footing, we use the IRR calculated by Venture Economics ve years after the
fund began. We also report the TVPI calculated by Venture Economics ve years after the fund
began where TVPI is the ratio of cumulative total value distributed value plus estimated residual
value to paid-in capital. As we noted earlier, these measures are potentially subject to a reporting
bias. These results also reect a somewhat greater number of more recent funds. Relative to the
results for the smaller sample, Table 3 shows that the VC returns are somewhat higher and the
buyout returns somewhat lower reecting the performance of more recent funds included in this
sample. The TVPI results in table 3 also indicate that the average private equity fund returns
10roughly twice the capital committed to it.
3.2 Performance Correlations
Tables 2 and 3 present ve dierent measures of performance. Table 4 shows the correlations of
those performance measures for the sample of 746 funds for which we can calculate all ve measures.
All ve measures are highly correlated with each other. For example, the IRR we calculate from
cash ows is strongly positively correlated with the IRR calculated by Venture Economics (at 0.98).
PME is strongly correlated with both the IRR calculated by Venture Economics and the IRR we
calculate (at 0.88). These results suggest that our IRR and PME calculations accurately reect
the actual performance of the funds. Finally, the IRR calculated by Venture Economics for a fund
after 5 years of existence also is strongly positively correlated with PME (at 0.86) and the IRR we
calculate from actual cash ows (at 0.89). This suggests that performance ve years after a fund
is a strong indication of the nal or ultimate fund performance.
In the persistence and fundraising analyses that follow, we use PME and the IRR that we
calculate from cash ows. As we mentioned earlier, we repeat all our tests using both Venture
Economics IRR measures the nal IRR and the ve-year IRR and obtain qualitatively and
statistically similar results.
3.3 Industry Returns Over Time
The performance of private equity overall in tables 2 and 3 masks a great deal of time series variation
in that performance. In Table 5 we detail that variation by presenting the average performance of
the funds started each year from 1980 to 1997, weighted by the capital committed to each fund.
We do not include returns prior to 1980, because we have fewer than three observations per vintage
year in most years prior to 1980. Table 5 presents three measures of performance. For the 746
funds that are largely liquidated, the table presents the IRR and PME we calculate. For the 1090
fund sample, the table presents the average Venture Economics IRR.
Column (1) of Table 5 shows a large increase in the number of funds in the mid-1980s as well as
in the second half of the 1990s. The three measures of performance show a consistent pattern: VC
funds performed relatively poorly in much of the 1980s with IRRs in the single digits and PMEs
below 1.00. Since 1988, VC funds have had higher IRRs as well as PMEs that always exceed 1.00.
11Buyout funds exhibit almost the reverse pattern with substantial IRRs and PMEs greater than
1.00 in the rst half of the 1980s, followed by relatively poor performance in the rst half of the
1990s.
3.4 Relation to Other Studies and Implications
As mentioned earlier, Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) use the same Venture Economics data set
that we employ in this paper. They use data from 1,245 funds and include returns calculated using
GP estimates of value rather than actual cash ows. The focus of their paper, however, is dierent
from ours in that they investigate whether and how idiosyncratic risk is priced in private equity.
They also use a dierent empirical methodology. They estimate alphas that are positive 4.68% per
year for venture funds and 0.72% per year for buyout funds but not statistically signicant using
value-weighted regressions. They also estimate betas of 1.11 for venture funds and 0.81 for buyout
funds have. The results for venture funds are qualitatively similar to ours. Our average PME of
1.21 translates into an alpha of 21% cumulated over the life of the venture fund. Our results for
buyout funds are slightly more negative with an average PME of 0.93. This may be driven by the
dierent sample size, by their use of unrealized returns, and by their dierent estimate of beta.
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) study the returns to investments in 73 venture and buyout
funds by one large limited partner in funds raised from 1981 to 1993. They nd that the funds in
their sample - 54 buyout funds and 19 venture capital funds - outperform the equity market and
have positive alphas. Again, the results for venture funds, despite the small sample, are qualitatively
similar to ours. The results for buyout funds are more positive than ours (and those of Jones and
Rhodes-Kropf (2003)). The primary dierence in our samples (aside from the number of funds) is
that Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) under sample rst-time funds 29% of their funds are rst
time funds while our buyout sample over samples rst-time funds 50% of our buyout funds are
rst time funds relative to the Venture Economics universe of 40% rst time funds.
What can we conclude from these three studies? First, the results are consistent with venture
funds having generated positive alphas over the estimated time period. This conclusion, however,
is by no means certain, as all three studies potentially suer from a positive selection bias and all
three may understate the market risk of venture funds. Second, the results for buyout funds are
more ambiguous. As noted earlier, however, these ambiguous results are based on the somewhat
12questionable assumption that the equity betas of buyout portfolio companies are roughly equal to
one.
4 Characteristics of Fund Returns
In this section, we explore how realized fund returns correlate with partnership and fund charac-
teristics. The basic empirical specication is as follows:
PMEit = t + (FundSizeit) + (Sequenceit) + V C + it (1)
where PMEit is calculated from the cash inows and outows of each fund, FundSizeit is the
logarithm of the capital committed to the fund, Sequenceit is the logarithm of the sequence number
of the fund (later funds of the same rm), and V C is a dummy equal to one if the partnership is
a venture capital rm and zero otherwise. We also include year xed eects in all specications to
control for the large inter-year variation in returns. In the regressions we report, standard errors
are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the general partnership level. We obtain, but
do not report, lower standard errors when we cluster by year. 8
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 6 show the cross sectional relations between fund performance and
fund characteristics. The estimates in column (1) indicate that larger funds and funds that have
higher sequence numbers have signicantly higher realized returns. The estimates also conrm that
the VC funds in our sample perform better on average than buyout funds. The point estimate on
the VC dummy is 0.24 with a standard error of 0.09.
In column (2) of Table 6, we include squared terms of Fund Size and Sequence number along
with the direct eects in the regression to analyze the functional form of this relation. The point
estimate on the linear term of (log) Fund Size increases signicantly when including the squared
term, and the coecient on the squared (log) Fund Size is negative and signicant. This suggests
a concave relation between Fund Size and performance. While larger funds have higher returns,
when funds become very large, i.e. mega-funds, their performance tends to decline.
The relationship between fund performance and the sequence number of the fund is convex,
although not signicantly so. The coecient on the squared term of Sequence Number is positive,
8We thank Gene Fama for suggesting that we do this.
13but not signicant while the coecient on the linear term is smaller, but remains positive and
signicant. To check the robustness of this relation we also choose a dierent specication in
column (3) where we include a dummy variable (First Time Fund) equal to one if the fund is a rst
time fund. The coecient on this dummy is negative (-.10) and signicant.
When we include rm (i.e., general partner) xed eects in column (4) of Table 6, the signs on
the Fund Size and Sequence Number variables switch. The coecient on Fund Size is signicant
while the coecient on Sequence Number is not. The Fund Size result indicates that while larger
funds have higher returns in the cross-section, when a given GP subsequently raises larger and
larger funds, its returns go down. The Sequence Number result has a similar interpretation. In the
cross-section, higher sequence number funds have higher returns. However, when a given GP raises
a subsequent fund, its returns decline, albeit not in a statistically signicant way. When we add
squared terms to the rm xed eects regressions in column (5), we nd the same concave pattern
for Fund Size that we found in the cross section.
4.1 Persistence of Fund Performance
We now turn to persistence in fund performance. The results in Table 6 provide a rst indication of
the importance of persistence in the private equity industry. The R2 of the regressions in columns
(1) to (3) increase by about 13 to 14 percent when we include rm xed eects, in columns (4)
and (6). We also nd that an F-test on the joint signicance of these partnership xed eects is
strongly signicant (not reported). The importance of rm xed eects suggests that partnerships
vary systematically in their average performance.
To test persistence more directly, we use a parametric approach. We extend the basic speci-
cation of the previous section to include lagged performance as right hand side variables. We use
lagged PME of the rst, second, and third previous funds raised by the GP. In table 9, we repeat
our regressions using the IRR we calculate from cash ows.
Performanceit = t +(FundSizeit)+(SequenceNumberit)+V C +(Performanceit 1)+it
(2)
Because we include the lagged return as a right hand side variable we cannot simultaneously
control for rm xed eects in this regression.
14Table 7 presents our results. We nd strong persistence in fund returns across dierent funds
within the same partnership. Column (1) contains the results from a regression of PME on lagged
PME only controlling for year xed eects and a VC dummy. The coecient on lagged PME is
positive and strongly signicant; the point estimate is 0.54 with a standard error of 0.17. The
coecient implies that a fund with 1% higher performance in the current fund is associated with
54 basis point better performance in the subsequent fund.9
The regression in column (2) includes the performance of both the previous fund and the fund
before that. Again the coecients on both performance measures are positive and signicant. The
coecients imply that a 1% increase in performance is associated with a combined 77 basis point
increase in performance in subsequent funds (the sum of the two coecients on lagged performance).
These persistence results also hold when we estimate the regressions for VC funds and buyout funds
separately (not reported).
It is possible that the current fund and the previous fund of a particular GP have some in-
vestments in common. This could mechanically induce persistence in our sample.10 To account
for this possibility, column (3) of the table presents estimates of a regression that includes only
the performance of the second previous fund. Because the second previous fund is typically raised
six years before the current fund, there is likely to be little, if any overlap. The coecient on the
performance of the second previous fund is positive (0.39) and signicant (at the 1% level). This
coecient compares to one of 0.54 on the rst previous fund suggesting that overlap does not drive
our results. In column (4), we include only the performance of the third previous fund. The point
estimate on third previous fund performance is 0.32. Because this reduces our sample size to only
128 funds, that coecient is not signicant. It is worth noting that we do obtain a statistically
signicant result on the third previous fund when we begin with the larger sample of 1090 funds.
In addition to the possibility that GP investments overlap across funds, it also is possible that
overlapping time periods across funds induce some persistence. If such overlaps are important,
persistence should decline with the amount of time that elapses between funds. In unreported
regressions, we test for this possibility by interacting the PMEs for the rst and second previous
funds with the log of the number of years between the current fund and the respective previous
9As mentioned earlier, all the results for performance hold if we use last reported Venture Economics IRR, cash
ow IRR, and TVPI as measures of performance.
10Investment across funds is likely to be more of an issue for venture funds than buyout funds. Buyout investors
are less likely to invest again in portfolio companies after the initial investment.
15fund. When we do this, the coecients on the interaction terms are positive not negative (but
statistically not signicant). This result suggests that our persistence results are not caused by
either investment overlap or time period overlap. If anything, this result is consistent with more
persistence for GPs who invest more slowly.
Next, we include controls for fund size and sequence number in columns (5) and (6). We
know from the previous section that fund size and sequence number are positively related to fund
performance. In column (5), we include only the PME of the previous fund. While the coecient
declines slightly to 0.47, it remains positive and signicant. In column (6), we include both lags
of performance and nd, again, that both are positively and signicantly related to current fund
performance. These persistence results are, of course, conditional on a GP raising a follow on
fund. We will show in Table 10 that the probability of raising a follow-on fund decreases with poor
performance. Therefore it is likely that we understate the amount of persistence in returns, because
our observations are left censored.
In column (7), we interact the lagged performance for the two previous funds with the log-
arithm of fund size in the current fund. The coecients on both of these interaction terms are
negative although they are not signicant. This result suggests that larger funds have lower short
run predictability. We also ran this regression for changes in fund size and get the same results
(not reported). However, the combined eect (direct eect and interaction term) is still positive
and signicant even for large rms, which means that for both groups we observe persistence in
performance. We can interpret these results in light of our previous nding that when a partner-
ship raises increasingly larger funds the returns of the new fund start to go down relative to the
performance of prior fund of the partnership.
In column (8) of Table 7, we consider the interaction of lagged performance for the two previous
funds and the sequence number of the current fund. The coecient on the interaction term for the
previous fund is negative and marginally signicant while the coecient on the interaction term
for the second previous fund is positive and signicant. We do not have a clear interpretation for
these results.
164.2 Additional Robustness Checks
Because the persistence results are unusual relative to the ndings for mutual funds and hedge
funds, we go through a number of additional checks to test the robustness of our ndings. In
table 8 we re-estimate the persistence results using fund IRRs based on the cash inows and
outows to the funds as performance measures. The regressions in columns (1) and (2) conrm
that performance increases with fund size and with sequence number. When squared terms are
included, fund size remains concave while sequence number becomes concave, but not signicantly
so. The regressions in columns (3) to (5) of table 8 show that our key persistent results continue
to hold. The performance of the previous fund and the second previous fund are statistically
signicantly related to current fund performance, both individually and when included together.
One possible concern about the documented persistence is that some GPs could be taking
on more systematic or market risk than others. In that case, higher systematic risk GPs would
have persistently higher returns. In columns (6) to (9), we attempt a simple risk adjustment by
including the average annual return to the S&P 500 in the ve years after the fund is raised and
excluding year xed eects. Loosely speaking, this is an attempt to estimate the beta of the private
equity industry. There are, however, a number of theoretical as well as empirical obstacles that
make it very dicult to estimate a beta for private equity funds. First, private equity funds are
highly illiquid and do not have a continuously traded market price. Any interim measures of return
before the liquidation of a fund (like quarterly reported returns) are necessarily based on subjective
valuations by the fund's general partners. Second, the typical fund takes several years to invest its
committed capital, making it dicult to exactly match the fund return to the analogous return on
the S&P 500.
In column (6), we adjust for the S&P 500 return, but do not include past performance. The
coecient on the S&P 500 is 1.17. In column (7) we interact the S&P 500 return and the venture
capital dummy. The coecient on the S&P 500 is 0.50 and is insignicant while the coecient
on the interaction term is 1.15 (with a standard error of 0.64). These coecients imply a market
beta of 0.50 for buyout funds and one of 1.65 for VC funds. While they are admittedly measured
imprecisely, the coecient for buyout funds seems implausibly low. Interestingly, the specication
in column (7) (with its lower risk for buyout funds) renders the dummy variable for venture capital
returns qualitatively and statistically insignicant.
17In the regressions in columns (8) and (9), we include, respectively, the returns of the previous
fund and the returns of the two previous funds. Adjusting for risk using S&P 500 returns increases
the estimates of persistence. In the regression in column (8), the coecient on the previous fund
increases to 0.59 from 0.32 (estimated including year xed eects). In the regression in column
(9), the sum of the coecients for the rst and second previous funds increases to 0.93 from 0.45
(estimated including year xed eects). These results strongly suggest that dierences in GP
market or systematic risk do not drive our persistence results.
We also attempted to adjust for dierences in risk by dividing the sample of private equity funds
into early stage venture funds, later stage venture funds, and buyout funds. If these dierent stages
are correlated with dierences in market risk, we would expect to see decreases in persistence after
controlling for the dierences. We obtain (not reported) qualitatively similar persistence results for
the three dierent types of private equity funds.
The last issue we consider is the possible eects of selection bias and data issues on persistence.
A number of studies in the mutual fund industry analyze how persistence of fund returns can be
aected by sample selection and data collection issues. Carhart et al. (2002) provide an in-depth
discussion of these problems in mutual fund studies.
Our sample diers from the mutual fund studies because we use only realized returns of a fund
at or near the end of its lifetime. We are able to use such a measure because private equity funds
have limited lifetimes. The advantage in this research design is that observations are not dropped
from the dataset if returns in a given period fall below a certain threshold as is sometimes the case in
mutual fund data sets. In other words, we believe we are less likely to face this type of selection bias
that is sometimes very serious in the mutual fund industry. In an interview in the Asset Alternative
Newsletter (Asset Alternative 2002), Jesse Reyes from Venture Economics discussed this type of
selection bias in the reporting of private equity funds. He claims that Venture Economics observes
very few incidents of funds that stop reporting to Venture Economics when the returns worsen.
Reyes supports his claim with the observation that Venture Economics does not rely solely on the
private equity funds for performance information, but also collects such information directly from
limited partners who are not prone to this type of selection bias.
It is worth pointing out that for mutual funds, Carhart et al. (2002) nd that the presence
of selection or survivorship bias causes overestimates of average returns and underestimates of the
18extent of persistence. If such biases are present in our sample, then our results for average returns
would become even more ambiguous, but our persistence results would become even stronger.
One additional possible bias involves a combination of risk and reporting bias. Perhaps there is
some variation in the amount of total risk GPs take on, but no variation in expected performance.
High risk funds with positive realizations will be able to raise a subsequent fund. High risk funds
with (very) negative realizations will not be able to raise a subsequent fund and may tend to stop
reporting. In the next fund (raised by the high risk funds with positive realizations), high risk
funds that have negative realizations will again cease to report. If this combination of risk and
reporting bias were true, the reported data would exhibit persistence of positive performance, but
not negative performance.
We test for the risk and reporting bias story in Table 9 by sorting all the funds for which we
have follow-on funds into performance terciles. We then calculate the conditional probability that
a partnerships next fund will either stay in the same performance tercile, or move into one of the
other two terciles. The results in Panel A measure fund performance using PME. The results in
Panel B use the Venture Economics IRR at the end of ve years. The results are consistent with
persistence in both parts of the distribution. In both panels, funds in the top (or bottom) terciles
have at least a 44% chance of remaining in those terciles and at most a 21% chance of moving to
the bottom (or top) terciles. In both panels, a chi-squared test rejects the equality of all cells at
the 1% level.
Overall, then, while we cannot completely rule out the possibility that dierences in systematic
risk or selection biases drive our persistence results, we believe that the evidence strongly favors
the existence of persistence in private equity.
5 Capital Flows and Fund Performance
In this section, we analyze how fund performance and the track record of a partnership aect the
ow of capital into funds. To take the mutual fund industry as a benchmark again, studies by
Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Chevalier and Ellison (2000) indicate that funds which outperform the
market experience increased capital inows. This relationship tends to be convex in the mutual
fund industry, meaning that mutual funds with above average performance actually increase their
19share of the overall mutual fund market.
We estimate the relationship between fund size and performance using Tobit regression estimates
to control for the left censoring in the size variable. If poorly performing GPs are unable to raise
follow-on funds, a simple OLS estimator will be biased because poor rst-time funds will drop out
of the sample. Yet not being able to raise a fund at all is clearly an (extreme) outcome of poor
initial performance.
In Table 10, we nd that capital ows into private equity funds are strongly positively and
signicantly related to past performance. Column (1) of Table 10 shows the basic specication
controlling only for sequence number and VC Dummy. (The logarithm of) Fund size is positively
and signicantly related to the performance of the previous fund. Funds with higher sequence
numbers are larger than rst time funds. This suggests that GPs of higher sequence number funds
are better able to survive the poor performance of one particular fund. Finally, venture funds are
smaller than buyout funds. In Column (2), we include lagged fund size to control for partnership
specic eects given that we cannot use rm xed eects in the specication with lagged return
variables. The only eect of this control is to render the VC dummy insignicant. The coecient
on previous performance is still positive and signicant.
Parallel to our analysis of persistence in returns we look at the relationship between fund size and
performance in the second previous fund. Column (3) shows that current fund size is positively and
signicantly related to the performance of each of the two previous funds. These ndings suggest
that funds with persistently good performance are especially favored in the fund raising process.
This timing eect makes sense given that returns take some time to realize in the private equity
industry. When a GP raises the rst follow-on fund, investors will not have learned completely
about the true quality of the previous fund. By the time of the second follow-on fund, limited
partners are better able to observe a longer track record of the GP.
Finally, we test whether the relation between fund size and prior performance is best charac-
terized by a linear relation or whether we observe a dierent functional form. For this reason, we
include a squared term of the PMEit 1 in the regression in column (4) of Table 10. The relation-
ship between fund size and performance is positive but concave. The coecient on the squared
term is negative and signicant. This result diers from that for the mutual fund industry where
researchers seem to nd a convex relation between fund size and excess returns. In column (5),
20we repeat this exercise by including a squared term for the PMEs of the rst two previous funds
along with the linear terms. We nd a concave relation between fund raising and returns for both
previous funds. 11
These ndings suggest that the top performing funds in the private equity industry grow less
than proportionally with the increase in performance than do the lower performers. Given that
most limited partners claim that the top funds are all highly oversubscribed, it seems likely that
the better funds voluntarily choose to stay smaller. This result, in turn, might help explain the
persistence in performance that we nd. By growing relatively less rapidly than the market on a
performance adjusted basis, top funds are able to avoid moving into regions of diminishing returns.
There are at least two reasons why superior partnerships might choose to do so. On the demand
side, it is possible that the number of good deals in the economy is limited at each point in time.
If partnerships believe that they face diseconomies of some sort even on their infra-marginal deals
when moving down the quality curve, it could be in their interest to grow slowly. On the supply
side, better funds might face constraints if GP human capital is not easily scalable and new qualied
general partners are scarce. Under either of these constraints, superior GPs have to trade o staying
small (and having high returns) or growing at the same speed as the market (or at a higher speed),
but moving down the marginal returns curve. In the next section, we look at the ow of funds and
the entry and exit decisions of partnerships in more detail.
6 Market Dynamics and Entry of Funds
In this section, we analyze the overall dynamics of performance and capital ows in the private
equity industry in more detail. So far, our results indicate that there is strong persistence in
performance across funds (at the upper as well as at the lower end). But at the same time, we
nd evidence that mediocre and poor performing funds grow proportionally faster than the top
funds, while the relationship of fund performance to returns is concave. This raises the question
how capital is allocated to more poorly performing funds and whether this has a spill over eect
on the industry overall.
11We also estimated, but do not report, probit regressions of the likelihood a GP raises a next fund. The likelihood
of raising a next fund is negatively related to the performance of the previous fund.
216.1 Timing of Entry and Cyclicality of Returns
We rst consider the entry and exit of partnerships into the private equity market and the fundrais-
ing activities of existing partnerships. To this end, we turn to the general database collected by
Venture Economics. The benet of this data is that it is more comprehensive in the coverage of
funds than the performance data we used thus far. Venture Economics estimates that this data set
covers 70 percent of the overall private equity market. The drawback, obviously, is that we do not
observe performance for all of the funds. Therefore, in this section we rely on aggregate measures
of industry returns as well as information on fund size and sequence number of funds that we found
to be positively related to performance in the previous analysis.
In Table 11, we look at the timing of funds raised by new private equity partnerships. We regress
the logarithm of the total number of partnerships started in a given year on dierent measures of
market returns in the current and previous year. We have 26 years of data for this exercise. In
column (1) of Table 11, we relate the number of partnerships that are started per year to the returns
on the Nasdaq Composite index in the current and the prior year. Lagged Nasdaq returns have a
coecient of 1.46 and a standard error 0.9, while current Nasdaq returns have a smaller coecient
of 0.47 with a standard error of 0.88. Similarly, in column (2) of Table 11, we include current and
lagged returns on the S&P 500. These have a positive and signicant relation (at the 10the current
S&P returns, and the coecient on the lagged returns is 2.41 with a standard error of 1.4. Finally,
we repeat this exercise for the aggregate returns of the venture capital industry. Column (3) of
Table 11 shows that there is an increase in partnership starts when lagged venture capital returns
are high, while the contemporaneous relation between industry returns and partnership starts is
positive but not signicant.
We also repeat these estimates using the aggregate amount of capital that is raised by rst
time partnerships in a given year. We report the results in columns (4) to (6) of the same Table
11. The results are consistent with the previous ndings based on the number of new entrants.
In fact, the relationship between lagged returns and partnership entry becomes stronger. This
suggests that not only do more partnerships decide to start up after a period in which the industry
performed well, but also, rst time funds tend to raise bigger amounts of capital when the private
equity industry performed well. Gompers and Lerner (1999) nd similar results for private equity
industry returns. This result is interesting because of our previous ndings that rst time funds
22perform markedly worse than established funds.
6.2 Which Type of Funds are Raised in Boom Times?
We now consider the extent to which capital that ows into the private equity industry in boom
times is allocated to worse funds than capital that enters in other periods. As mentioned before,
we do not observe individual fund performance for the funds in the full Venture Economics data
set. However, we do observe whether a partnership raises a follow on fund. Our earlier analysis
indicates that the ability to raise a follow on fund is a rough proxy for fund performance.
In Table 12, we report the results of a linear probability model in which we relate the likelihood
of raising a follow-on fund to market conditions at the time the initial fund was raised. We construct
a dummy variable equal to one if a given partnership raises a follow-on fund and zero if the current
fund is the last fund. Because we do not want to bias the results for partnerships that only recently
raised a fund (and therefore, have not had enough time pass to need to raise a next fund), we
drop any fund that was started after 1998. We regress this dummy variable on the measures of
market performance we have used throughout the paper: S$P 500, Nasdaq Composite Index, and
venture industry returns. We include contemporaneous performance at the time the current fund
was raised, and market performance one year before the current fund started.
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 12 report that funds raised in years when market returns are high
and in years after market returns are high are less likely to raise a follow on fund. This negative
relation is signicant for all four contemporaneous and lagged performance measures for Nasdaq
and S&P. This suggests that funds raised in boom years are more likely to perform poorly and,
therefore, are unable to raise a follow on fund. Column (7) uses the annual return to venture
funds as calculated by Venture Economics. The results of this regression are more ambiguous. The
coecient on contemporaneous venture performance is positive and of the same magnitude as the
negative coecient on lagged performance.
In columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table 12, we also include a measure of market returns in the third
year after the current fund was raised. From anecdotal evidence, we know that partnerships tend
to raise new funds about every three years. Therefore, we include this three year leading market
indicator to capture market conditions at the time the partnership is most likely to be trying to
raise a next fund. The coecient on the three-year leading market index is positive and strongly
23signicant for all measures of market returns. Again, this nding is consistent with private equity
rms being able to raise capital more easily when overall market conditions are good.
Finally, we repeat the above estimation for follow on funds by new general partnerships or rst-
time funds (as opposed to follow on funds by an existing GP). We report the results in columns
(3), (6) and (9) of Table 12. The same pattern we observe for individual funds holds true for GP
starts. GPs that enter the market in boom times are less likely to raise a follow on fund. However,
if the market conditions are positive three years after the initial funds were raised, the likelihood
of being able to raise a follow-on fund improves signicantly.
In sum, it appears that the marginal dollar invested in boom times goes towards nancing funds
which are less likely to be able to raise a subsequent fund, which we interpret a proxy for poor
performance.
6.3 Are Fund Returns Aected by the Number of New Entrants?
Finally, we consider the eects of the entry of new partnerships and funds in boom times on overall
industry performance and on the performance of particular types of funds.
In Table13, we regress the performance of individual funds on the number of new funds entering
the industry in the year that the fund was started, as well as our usual controls (fund size, sequence
number and VC Dummy). For this table, we use the larger sample of private equity funds and we
measure performance using the Venture Economics IRR after ve years. The variable Entry is the
logarithm of the aggregate number of new private equity funds in a given year. We also control for
the returns on the Nasdaq Composite Index in the year a fund was started, as we know from the
results in the previous table that funds are more likely to get started in boom years.12
We report results for the overall industry in columns (1) and (2) of Table 13. Column (1) shows
the correlation between fund returns and the logarithm of the number of new entrants. The point
estimate is negative (-0.14) and statistically insignicant. However, if we include an interaction
term between the entry variable and the logarithm of the sequence number of a fund, we nd that
the coecient on the interaction term is positive and statistically signicant (the point estimate is
12We also repeat the regressions in Table13 when measuring entry as the number of new partnerships entering the
industry in a given year. The results are qualitatively unchanged. Similarly, we also include annual returns on the
S&P 500 or the venture capital index as measures of market performance. Again the results are qualitatively the
same.
240.76 with a standard error of 0.28). And the coecient on the direct eect of entry is now negative
and statistically signicant as well (point estimate of -0.61 and a standard error of 0.20). These
results suggest that in periods of increased entry of funds into the industry overall, we observe a
larger negative eect on the young funds (those with lower sequence numbers) than on the older,
more established funds.
In columns (3) and (4), we repeat the above analysis only for the sub-sample of venture capital
funds. In this specication, we base the aggregate number of new entrants only on new venture
capital funds that enter the industry in a given year. We nd that the eect is stronger in the
VC industry. In column (3), we only include the direct eect of the number of new entrants. The
coecient on this variable is negative and barely signicant (coecient of -0.34 with a standard
error of 0.18). In column (4), we again include the interaction term between the entry variable
and the logarithm of the sequence number of a fund. The coecient on this term is positive and
signicant, with a coecient of 1.13 and a standard error of 0.42. When we combine the direct
eect and the interaction eect, the returns of older funds are relatively unaected by the inow
of new funds. The returns of the entering funds, however, are signicantly lower in these periods.
The overall eect on the industry returns, therefore, is negative in periods with a large number of
new entrants.
Finally, in columns (5) and (6), we repeat these regressions for the sub-sample of buyout funds.
We base the aggregate number of new entrants only on new buyout funds that enter the industry
in a given year. In column (5), we nd that the direct eect of the number of new entrants is
negative and statistically signicant for the buyout industry. The coecient on the entry variable
is -1.35 with a standard error of 0.25. Overall returns in the buyout industry are signicantly
diluted in periods where many new funds enter the market. In column (6), we again include the
interaction term between the entry variable and the logarithm of the sequence number of a fund.
The coecient on this term is positive, but smaller than for the sample of VC funds and it is not
statistically signicant. This result suggests that unlike in the VC industry, the returns of older
funds in the buyout industry (those with higher sequence numbers) are less isolated from the entry
of new funds. Returns for all funds in the buyout entry seem diluted by the inow of new funds.13
13One could speculate about the reasons, why we observe such a dierence between the returns in the buyout
versus the venture capital industry. There are a number of practitioners as well as also academics who suggest that
buyout returns are more sensitive to market timing and herding eects, see for example Kaplan and Stein (1993).
257 Summary and Implications
In this paper, we investigate the performance of private equity partnerships using a data set of
individual fund returns collected by Venture Economics. Over the entire sample period (1980 to
1997), average fund returns net of fees are roughly equal to those of the S&P 500. Weighted
by committed capital, venture funds outperform the S&P 500 while buyout funds do not. These
results are similar to the ndings of Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) and Ljungqvist and Richardson
(2003). Our estimates also suggest that gross of fees, both types of private equity partnerships earn
returns exceeding the S&P 500. These conclusions, however, are not certain, as all three studies
potentially suer from a positive selection bias and all three may understate market risk.
Our results for persistence in performance, however, are not ambiguous. For all measures of fund
performance and at both ends of the performance distribution, we nd that performance persists
strongly across funds by individual private equity partnerships. If there are survivorship or selection
biases in our sample of funds, actual persistence would likely be greater than the persistence we
measure.
Moreover, we document that performance increases with fund size and with partnership expe-
rience. The relation with fund size is concave, suggesting decreasing returns to scale. Similarly,
the track record of a partnership positively aects capital ows into new funds of the partnerships.
But in contrast to the convex relationship in the mutual fund industry, this relationship is concave
in private equity.
Finally, we nd some evidence that funds that are raised in boom times and rms that are
started in boom times are less likely to raise a follow-on fund, suggesting that these funds perform
worse. In conjunction with our results on average returns, this suggests a boom and bust type cycle
in which positive market-adjusted returns encourage entry that leads to negative market-adjusted
returns, etc.
These empirical relations between performance and capital ows dier substantially from the
ones found for mutual funds. We think the most likely explanation for these results is a model of
In contrast, it is often stated that VC returns are crucially driven by the specic human capital or networks of a
funds general partners. However, Since our sample of buyout funds is relatively small and less comprehensive than
the sample of venture capital funds (336 versus 754 observations), we do not want to overstate the inference we can
draw from the dierences between the two industries. Our results also do not include returns on funds raised in 1999
and 2000, a period that appears to have particularly poor returns for venture funds.
26underlying heterogeneity in the skills of GPs, and concavity in the production function. Successful
partnerships might choose not to grow their funds until the excess returns have been diluted if there
are strong diseconomies from scale and scope. This could be true for a number of non-mutually
exclusive reasons. First, a successful private equity investor cannot easily scale up investments by
either putting more money in any particular deal or investing in more companies, since he provides
other inputs that are dicult to scale, such as time and advice. Second, it may also be dicult
for a successful fund to hire partners who have equally strong skills as the existing ones. Third, it
is possible that top GPs choose to raise less capital than they could because the number of good
deals in the economy is limited at each point in time. However, passing up less protable (but
potentially still positive NPV projects) could only be an optimal choice for the GP, if there are
negative spill-over eects on the infra-marginal deals from engaging in these investments.
If, indeed, the persistence results are driven by heterogeneity in GP skills and limited scalability
of superior human capital, it remains puzzling that these returns to superior skill are not appro-
priated by the scarce input (i.e., the GP) in the form of higher fees and larger funds. On the other
hand, it also is puzzling that the cyclical nature of the industry seems to result in capital ows to
funds that subsequently have very lower returns.
One could conjecture that better performing funds also have better governance structures or
limited partners with more bargaining power (see for example Lerner and Schoar (2002) for a
possible mechanism). While these explanations are possible, we do not have a way to test them in
the current paper. These ndings highlight the need for future work that aims to better understand
the organizational structure of the private equity industry.
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29Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
a
Sample: Funds with Performance Data Full Sample of VE Funds
All Funds VC Funds Buyout Funds All Funds VC Funds Buyout Funds
Size 172.2 102.9 415.79 115.5 53.3 261.5
(378.1) (138.6) (612.1) (279.2) (78.6) (430.4)
Fraction 1st 0.41 0.38 0.50 0.40 0.39 0.42
Fraction 2nd 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22
Fraction 3rd 0.14 0.16 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.11
N of Observations 746 580 166 1814 1272 542
aIn Columns (1) to (3) we restrict the sample to funds for which we all relevant cash ows have been
realized. This restricts the sample mainly to funds that were started before 1996. In the following we base
most of the performance analysis on this sample of funds with realized performance. Size is measured as
the dollar amount of capital that is committed to a fund. The rst entry in this cell is mean fund size,
and the second entry is the standard deviation. Sequence is the sequence number of a fund. Fraction 1st,
2nd 3rd indicates the fraction of funds in the overall sample that are rst time, second time and third time
funds respectively. Columns (4) to (6) are based on the full sample of private equity funds in the Venture
Economics database over the equivalent time period. We exclude funds that are not private equity funds
and those that have missing information on size and year of closing. Standard deviations are in parenthesis.
30Table 2: Private Equity Returns: Cash Flow Based
a
Equal Weighted Peformance Measures
Sample: All Funds VC Funds Buyout Funds












N of Observations 746 580 166
Size Weighted Peformance Measures












N of Observations 746 580 166
aFund IRRs and PME (Public Market Equivalent) are calculated based on the actual cash ows of the
funds. For each cell we report four dierent entries: The rst is the median return, the second the average
return, the third the standard deviation and nally we report the distribution of returns at the 25th and
75th percentile. The rst panel of the table reports equal weighted performance measures, while the second
panel reports size weighted performance measures (where size is the amount of committed capital that a fund
has). PME is calculated by discounting cash inows and outows with the returns in the public markets over
the same time period. The benchmark we use here to discount fund are the returns on the S&P500 index.
Only funds that did not have a cash inow or outow for at least 2 years are included in this calculation.
IRRCF is the IRR at the end of a fund's lifetime based on actual cash inows and outows. On average
this excludes funds which were started after 1994. IRRV E contains the IRR that are reported to Venture
Economics at the end of a fund's lifetime for the sample for which we can calculate IRRCF.
31Table 3: Private Equity Returns: Sample of Mature Funds
a
Equal Weighted Peformance Measures
Sample: All Funds VC Funds Buyout Funds








N of Observations 1090 754 336
Size Weighted Peformance Measures








N of Observations 1090 754 336
aFund IRRs and TVPI (Total Value to Paid-in-Capital) are obtained from Venture Economics. IRRV E5
is the reported IRR after 5 years of fund existence. We only use funds that have at least a ve year horizon.
For each cell we report four dierent entries: The rst is the median return, the second the average return,
the third the standard deviation and nally we report the distribution of returns at the 25th and 75th
percentile. The rst panel of the table reports equal weighted performance measures, while the second panel
reports size weighted performance measures (where size is the amount of committed capital that a fund has
under management).
32Table 4: Fund Performance Measures
a
IRRV E IRRCF PME IRRV E5 TVPI
IRRV E 1
IRRCF 0.98 1
PME 0.88 0.88 1
IRRV E5 0.92 0.89 0.86 1
TVPI 0.74 0.75 0.65 0.60 1
aEach entry reports the correlation between the dierent
measures of fund perofrmance based on a sample of 746 funds
that have information about cash ow data. IRRV E is based on
the realized IRR of funds started in a given period as reported
by Venture Economics. PME (Public Market Equivalent) is the
ratio of capital outows to capital inows discounted by the
cummulative returns on the S&P 500 during the same period.
IRRV E5 is based on the IRR reported to Venture Economics at
the end of ve years after the rst closing of the funds. TVPI
(Total Value to Paid-in-Capital) is the sum of all cash outows
to LPs divided by the sum of all cash contributions to the fund.
33Table 5: Private Equity Returns by Vintage Year a
Sample: All Funds VC Funds Buyout Funds
Year Obs IRRV E Obs IRRCF PME Obs IRRV E Obs IRRCF PME Obs IRRV E Obs IRRCF PME
1980 22 0.23 21 0.22 0.99 20 0.21 20 0.22 0.95 { { { { {
1981 24 0.13 18 0.14 0.68 23 0.09 18 0.10 0.51 { { { { {
1982 29 0.05 25 0.05 0.35 28 0.05 23 0.05 0.35 { { { { {
1983 65 0.14 54 0.15 0.71 59 0.08 48 0.07 0.53 6 0.33 6 0.30 1.06
1984 74 0.15 63 0.16 0.89 68 0.06 57 0.07 0.54 6 0.29 6 0.29 1.30
1985 59 0.23 49 0.23 1.24 47 0.09 37 0.10 0.73 12 0.34 12 0.18 1.00
1986 61 0.13 52 0.14 0.91 45 0.10 36 0.10 0.76 16 0.17 16 0.18 1.13
1987 97 0.14 85 0.16 0.84 68 0.12 63 0.12 0.98 29 0.14 22 0.16 0.84
1988 71 0.12 63 0.14 0.90 48 0.18 42 0.20 1.16 23 0.11 21 0.13 0.79
1989 79 0.18 67 0.16 1.01 54 0.18 45 0.18 1.03 25 0.18 22 0.14 1.00
1990 45 0.21 36 0.22 1.18 27 0.27 20 0.29 1.53 18 0.18 14 0.20 1.05
1991 24 0.20 15 0.16 0.95 18 0.26 11 0.22 1.13 6 0.14 6 0.14 0.87
1992 50 0.23 35 0.23 0.99 26 0.26 18 0.32 1.31 24 0.22 17 0.09 0.79
1993 67 0.23 56 0.21 1.09 39 0.30 45 0.35 1.65 28 0.20 11 0.18 0.84
1994 68 0.23 55 0.38 1.45 42 0.32 49 0.48 1.81 26 0.17 6 0.19 0.89
1995 70 0.18 52 0.20 1.14 43 0.44 { 0.54 2.05 27 0.10 7 0.07 0.62
1996 67 0.19 { { { 31 0.61 { { { 36 0.05 { { {
1997 109 0.13 { { { 58 0.41 { { { 51 0.06 { { {
aIRRV E is based on the realized IRR at the end of a fund's lifetime (as calculated by Venture Economics) for funds
that were started in a given period. IRRCF is the IRR that we calculate based only on the actual cash ows of a
fund. We base our IRR calculations only on the actual csh ows of funds, not reported net asset value. Therefore we
concentrate on funds that have already realized most of their investments. PME (Public Market Equivalent) is the
ratio of capital outows to capital inows discounted by the cummulative returns on the S&P 500 during the same
period. Again we base our calculations only on actual cash ows. All fund performance measures are weighted by the
capital under management. Obs is the number of observations per year. Since we have less than three observations
per year for the buyout funds prior to 1983, we only start reporting annual performance measures for these funds in
1983.
34Table 6: Fund Performance and Fund Characteristics
a
Dependent Variable: PME (Public Market Equivalent)
log(Size) 0.08 0.53 0.09 -0.14 0.30




log(Sequence) 0.14 0.03 -0.37 -0.43






VC Dummy 0.24 0.20 0.28 0.05 0.03
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.24) (0.23)
Firm F.E. No No No Yes Yes
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.29 0.30
N of Observations 746 746 746 398 398
aThe dependent variable is realized PME (Public Market Equivalent). PME is calculated by discounting
the actual cash outows and cash inows that the fund received with the returns on the S&P 500 over the
same time period and forming the ratio of the discounted cash inows over the discounted outows. Since we
only include funds for which the majority of the cash ows have been realized, on average this restricts the
sample to funds that were started before 1996. All the data is obtained from Venture Economics. Size is the
amount of capital a fund has under management. Sequence is the sequence number of a fund. VC Dummy
is equal to one if the fund is a venture capital fund and zero for buyout, LBO and mezzanine funds. First
is a dummy equal one if the fund is a rst time fund. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are adjusted
for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
35Table 7: Persistence of Fund Performance
a
Dependent Variable: PME (Public Market Equivalent)
PMEt 1 0.54 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.89 0.72
(0.17) (0.21) (0.17) (0.21) (0.63) (0.52)
PMEt 2 0.28 0.39 0.28 0.82 0.23
(0.13) (0.14) (0.13) (0.52) (0.51)
PMEt 3 0.32
(0.24)
log(Size) 0.09 0.09 0.26 0.09
(0.04) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
log(Sequence) 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.12
(0.10) (0.20) (0.22) (0.21)
VC Dummy 0.41 0.51 0.46 0.49 0.49 0.60 0.56 0.57









Firm F.E. No No No No No No No No
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.25 0.22 0.27 0.28 0.28
N of Observations 398 225 225 128 398 225 225 225
aThe dependent variable is realized PME (Public Market Equivalent). PME is calculated by discounting
the actual cash outows and cash inows that the fund received with the returns on the S&P 500 over the
same time period and forming the ratio of the discounted cash inows over the discounted outows. Since we
only include funds for which the majority of the cash ows have been realized, on average this restricts the
sample to funds that were started before 1996. All the data is obtained from Venture Economics. PMEt 1,
PMEt 2 and PMEt 3 are lagged realized PMEs of a given private equity rm's previous fund, the fund
before the last, and the third prevopis fund, respectively. Size is the amount of capital a fund has under
management. Sequence is the sequence number of a fund. VC Dummy is equal to one if the fund is a venture
capital fund and zero for buyout, LBO and mezzanine funds. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are
adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
36Table 8: Fund Performance Based on IRR
a
Dependent Variable: IRR - Cash Flows Based
log(Size) 3.23 5.98 4.05 5.83 4.98 4.71 4.72 3.45 3.41




log(Sequence) 4.75 5.02 4.98 6.91 4.35 7.83 7.76 6.71 8.70




IRRt 1 0.32 0.26 0.59 0.61
(0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.18)
IRRt 2 0.27 0.19 0.32
(0.08) (0.09) (0.14)
S&P500 1.17 0.50 0.33 0.31
(0.31) (0.49) (0.27) (0.23)
S&P500*VC Dummy 1.15 1.17 1.25
(0.64) (0.61) (0.81)
VC Dummy 2.32 1.83 8.91 11.62 12.35 8.11 -1.76 -1.65 -0.97
(3.41) (3.46) (4.12) (5.63) (5.23) (2.39) (1.30) (1.40) (1.36)
Firm F.E. No No No No No No No No No
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
Adjusted R
2 0.15 0.16 0.28 0.27 0.32 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.23
N of Observations 746 746 398 235 225 746 746 398 225
aThe dependent variable is realized fund IRR at the end of the fund's existence. IRR is calculated
based on the actual cash ows of the fund (takedowns and distributions), as reported to venture
Economics. On average this restricts the sample to funds that were started before 1998. IRRt 1
and IRRt 2 are lagged realized returns of a given private equity rm's previous fund and the fund
before the last, respectively. Size is the amount of capital a fund has under management. Sequence
is the sequence number of a fund. VC Dummy is equal to one if the fund is a venture capital
fund and zero for buyout, LBO and mezzanine funds. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are
adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
37Table 9: Transition Probabilities: Fund Performance
a
Panel A: PME
Lower Tercile Medium Tercile Upper Tercile
Lower Tercile 44% 37% 19%
Medium Tercile 24% 34% 42%
Upper Tercile 11% 34% 55%
Panel B: IRRV E5
Lower Tercile Medium Tercile Upper Tercile
Lower Tercile 49% 31% 20%
Medium Tercile 30% 38% 32%
Upper Tercile 21% 31% 48%
aWe sort all funds for which we have follow on funds into performance terciles and
calculate the conditional probability that a partnership's next fund will either stay in the
same performance tercile, or move into one of the other two terciles. The results in Panel
A are based on PME (Public Market Equivalent over the entire lifetime of the fund. For
this calculation we use 398 fund that have at least one follow-on fund in our sample of
rezlized funds. In Panel B we use IRRV E5, the IRR of a fund after ve years of a fund's
existence. This allows us to employ a larger sample of 639 funds that have at least one
follow-on fund. Again we calculate conditional Markov probablilites as in Panel A.
38Table 10: Fund Size and the Track Record of the Firm
a
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Fundsize
PMEt 1 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.88 0.49











log(Lagsize) 0.78 0.73 0.72 0.67
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.11)
log(Sequence) 1.07 0.73 0.43 0.71 0.52
(0.14) (0.14) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21)
VC Dummy -1.20 -0.25 -0.48 -0.29 -0.55
(0.22) (0.24) (0.27) (0.23) (0.27)
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R
2 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.25
N of Observations 746 746 399 746 399
aThe dependent variable (fund size) is the logarithm of the amount of capital committed
to the next fund of a partnership. We estimate a Tobit regression, since the size variable is
censored a zero. If a partnership does not raise a follow on fund, the size of the next fund
is zero. PMEt 1 and PMEt 2 are the Public Market Equivalent (for construction of PME
please see Table 6) of the previous fund and the one prior to this, respectively. We only
include funds that are raised prior to 1996, and only one observation per fund. Lagsize is
the amount of capital a fund has under management in the fund before the current one.
Sequence is the sequence number of a fund. VC Dummy is equal to one if the fund is a
venture capital fund and zero for buyout, LBO and mezzanine funds. Standard errors are
in parenthesis and are adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
39Table 11: Entry of Private Equity Firms into the Industry
a









VC Returnst 0.02 -0.08
(0.07) (0.13)
VC Returnst 1 0.20 0.45
(0.06) (0.13)
Buyout Returnst 0.00 -0.03
(0.01) (0.02)
Buyout Returnst 1 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Adjusted R
2 0.02 0.11 0.55 0.21 0.08 0.13 0.56 0.21
N of Observations 26 26 20 20 26 26 20 20
aThe dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is the aggregate number of new partnerships that are
started in a given year from 1975 to 2000. The dependent variable in columns (4) to (6) is the logarithm
of the total amount of capital raised by rst time funds in a given year, again from 1975 to 2000. Nasdaq
and Nasdaqt 1 are the annual returns on the Nasdaq Composite index in the current and the prior year,
respectively. Similarly, S&P and S&Pt 1 are the annual returns on the S&P 500 index in the current and
the prior year, respectively. And nally, VC Returns and Buyout Returns are the aggregate annual returns
of the venture capital and the buyout industry, respectively, as reported by Venture Economics. Since we
only have venture industry return since 1980 the number of observations in columns (3), (4), (7) and (8)
drops to 20. Moreover, entering rms in columns (3) and (7) are restricted to venture capital rms. Similarly
entering rms in column (4) and (8) are restricted only to buyout rms. Standard errors are in parenthesis
and are adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
40Table 12: Probability of Raising a Follow-on Fund
a
Dependent Variable: Does Fund Raise a Follow-on Fund?
Nasdaqt -0.26 -0.15 -0.16
(0.03) (0.04) (0.09)




S&Pt -0.30 -0.23 -0.24
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11)




VC Returnst 0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
VC Returnst 1 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
VC Returnst+3 0.00 0.02
(0.00) (0.00)
log(Sequence) 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log(Size) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Adjusted R
2 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.03
N of Observations 2789 2467 751 2831 2503 756 1608 1147 481
aLinear probability regression of the likelihood that an existing fund raises a follow on fund. The de-
pendent variable is a dummy equal to one if the fund raises a next fund and zero otherwise. Nasdaq is the
annual return on the Nasdaq Composite Index in the year the fund was raised, Nasdaqt 1 and Nasdaqt+3
are the returns in the one year lagged and the three year leading Nasdaq Composite index, respectively.
The former captures the market conditions in which the current fund was raised and the latter capture the
market conditions in which the next fund will be raised. Similarly, S&Pi is the annual return on the S&P
500 and VC Returns is the annual return of the venture capital industry as reported by Venture Economics.
To avoid bias for funds that were only raised very recently, we drop the last three years of data, 1999-2001.
Size is the amount of capital under management in the current fund. Sequence is the sequence number of
the current fund. VC Dummy is equal to one if the fund is a venture capital fund and zero for buyout, LBO
and mezzanine funds. Columns (3), (6) and (9) only include the sup-sample of rst time funds. Standard
errors are in parenthesis and are adjusted for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
41Table 13: Market Entry and Fund Performance
a
Dependent Variable: IRRV E5 (IRR after ve years)
All Funds VC Funds Buyout Funds
Entry -0.14 -0.61 -0.34 -0.89 -1.35 -1.54
(0.14) (0.20) (0.18) (0.36) (0.25) (0.36)
Entry*log(Sequence) 0.76 1.13 0.33
(0.28) (0.42) (0.28)
log(Sequence) 0.44 -3.36 0.57 -4.86 0.12 -1.21
(0.15) (1.34) (0.21) (1.86) (0.08) (1.21)
log(Size) 0.09 0.09 0.20 0.15 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05)
Nasdaqt 0.28 0.29 0.79 0.50 0.17 0.17
(0.11) (0.11) (0.31) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11)
VC Dummy 0.66 0.63 - - - -
(0.19) (0.19) - - - -
Adjusted R
2 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.22 0.23
N of Obs 1090 1090 754 754 336 336
aThe dependent variable is realized fund IRR after ve years of existence, which means we include one
observation per fund. On average this restricts the sample to funds that were started before 1998, and only
one observation per fund. Entry is logarithm of the number of private equity funds overall which are started
in the same year as a given fund. This variable is calculated based on the full Venture Economics database.
In columns (1) and (2) we use the sample of venture capital and buyout funds. In columns (3) and (4) we
use only the sub-sample of venture capital funds. Accordingly the entry variable in these columns is based
only on the number of venture capital funds entering the market in a given year. And in columns (5) and
(6) we use only the sub-sample of buyouts funds. Parallel to before, we use only the number of buyout funds
entering the market in a given year to calculate the entry variable. Nasdaqt is the annual return on the
Nasdaq Composite Index. Size is the amount of capital a fund has under management in the current fund.
Sequence is the sequence number of the fund. VC Dummy is equal to one if the fund is a venture capital
fund and zero for buyout, LBO and mezzanine funds. Standard errors are in parenthesis and are adjusted
for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity.
42